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Marked
Version —
The Problem of Metaphor
in Linguistic Theory
Meredith Mullen
PH335
Mr. Webb
Final Paper —
Fall 1971
[The
general assumption that the meaning of a verbal expression is equal
to the sum of the meanings of its component
terms as modified by the relationships among those terms is a fair
working assumption for a theory of language.]
Behaviorists would add that the meaning is also modified by the
circumstance under which the expression is uttered. Alston, however,
makes the point: “It is an extremely important fact about language
that it is possible to use a word intelligibly without using it
in any of its senses.”1
The usage he refers to is figurative language, principally metaphor.
Because metaphorical expressions are not confined to poetry but
pervade the language as a whole, a theory of language cannot be
complete unless it makes provision for such expressions.
|
 |
| [Whether
the desire for communication originally arose from physical necessity,
ritual celebration, a communal instinct, or the urge to express
abstract ideas, it is certain that the purpose of language is to
effect communication among human beings.]
And as long as human beings continue to have new experiences—new
to the individual, even if not to the species—they will seek
to extend the range of their verbal capacity to include the expression
and interpretation of those new experiences. In order to do so,
they must approach as near as possible to the idea with their known
language, and then find some means by interpolation or extrapolation
of filling the gap. |
 |
| Skinner distinguishes
two kinds of extension of language that are employed in order to
meet the demands of a new situation.2
The first is “generic extension,” by which a property
which identifies a class of things (not necessarily concrete objects;
they may be actions, qualities, ideas, sensations, etc.) is recognized
in the new situation and provokes the response which applies to
all the members of that class. Skinner observes that practical considerations
tend to control the properties which are engaged in generic extension.
In his example, “chair,” it is the use of the object which
reveals its membership in a certain class and thus causes the proper
response of “chair” to be emitted. [He
does not indicate, however, how one recognizes the intended use
of a new object before one knows to what class it belongs. The intended
use of many articles of furniture of modern design is not at all
obvious from their appearance; and, on the other hand, it is possible
to put to the use normally reserved for a chair many things for
which the response “chair” would be inappropriate.]
Nevertheless, the essence of generic extension is that an old expression
is used for a new experience to which the expression literally applies. |
 |
| In contrast,
metaphorical extension occurs when the new experience is perceived
not as belonging to an already established class, but as possessing
significant similarities to a member of an established class. The
properties which render them similar are among the very properties
which do not relate the members of the class. Skinner’s
example here is that of a child’s describing his first taste
of a carbonated beverage as tasting “like my foot’s asleep.”
[In my own memory is the distinct
recollection of informing my mother once that my foot “feels
like ginger ale.” I do not know exactly what age I was at the
time—probably five or six—but I cannot believe that I
had never had the experience of temporary loss of circulation at
an age when the prickly sensation of ginger ale was already familiar.
But it is very likely that until tasting ginger ale I never had
so apt a phrase at my disposal to convey the nature of the feeling
in my foot. It was not the novel experience that gave rise to the
metaphor, but rather the acquisition of an effective new way to
describe a commonplace experience.] |
 |
| [Again,
however, whether the precise relationships or sequence of experiences
are strictly accurate as Skinner presents them, it is the principle
of his observation with which we are concerned: namely, that primary
properties relate things in a class, which is enlarged by generic
extension; whereas secondary properties, present at the time of
reinforcement but not governing the reinforcement,
relate things in separate classes by metaphorical extension.] |
 |
| Although Chomsky
and Skinner profess diametric opposition to one another’s theories
of language, and although Skinner is concerned with meaning of expressions
while Chomsky maintains his interest to be in the area of syntax
rather than semantics, there is an interesting way in which their
theories can be brought together. Chomsky
suggests that as language is subdivided into classes, the classes
fall into a hierarchy of levels depending upon the degree of subdivision.3
Each successive level contains finer distinctions of category; for
instance, on the third level the class “Nouns” from level
two might become “Abstract Nouns,” “Concrete Nouns,”
etc. Presumably all the words of the language are represented at
each level, and at each level they are assigned to a category within
their category at the previous level. (Some words—grammatical
homonyms—may fall into more than one
category.) The highest level comprises the minutest possible breakdowns
of category: members of a given category are “mutually substitutable
in the set of generated utterances. Many of them may contain just
a single formative.”4
Chomsky then proceeds to demonstrate that it is theoretically possible
to assign degrees of grammaticalness on the basis of the hierarchical
level at which a given sequence of formatives may be derived. |
|
| [Now,
if the expressions in a particular category at the highest level
(level m, in Chomsky’s scheme) are mutually substitutable,
and if the categories at each level are refinements of the categories
at preceding levels, then it follows that all the elements of a
given category at level m occurred together in a single category
with other elements at all lower levels; and therefore that any
given expression in a category at some lower level g may
be mutually substitutable with some of the other elements in that
category but not necessarily with all. For two expressions to be
in the same category at any level indicates a degree of correspondence
between them; on the first level, merely that they belong to the
same language. If two terms are mutually substitutable, their meaning
must be identical in at least one sense. If two terms are in the
same category at level l and separated at level m,
they must be very closely related to be distinguished only at the
last division. Whatever properties cause two elements to fall into
the same category at any point, therefore, are the properties in
which they resemble one another; and the higher the level at which
two elements not mutually substitutable remain in the same
category, the greater the degree of similarity between them. On
the lower levels, the similarity may be purely structural; but the
nearer they approach to identity of meaning, the more their similarity
must be semantic in nature.] |
 |
| [If
we consider, therefore, two expressions categorized together at
some median level g which are not categorized together at
level h, we know that their maximum degree of similarity
is attained at level g. Up to that point the two expressions
can under some circumstances be substituted for one another. Beyond
that point, however, to employ one expression in a context which
would normally contain the other is to utter an unintelligible sequence
of words or to require the reader/listener to comprehend its significance
on the basis of the similarity of the substituted expression. This
kind of departure from literal sense is what is known as metaphor;
and it is here that Skinner’s distinction may be re-introduced:
the use of an expression which belongs in one category may effectively
occur in the place of an expression from another category by virtue
of the similarities in meaning which are not sufficient to
identify one with the other.] |
 |
| [Chomsky
does not deal with the problem of metaphor explicitly. There are
broad dark areas in his reasoning in which the question could conceivably
be treated, such as his notion of the “creative aspect”
of language. One tends to suspect, however, that his failure—and
that of other linguistic theorists—to confront the matter is
not, as one might initially suppose, due to the fact that metaphor
is irrelevant to the central issues of linguistic analysis, but
rather is a consequence of the fact that they do not know how to
deal with it, and their inadequate treatment of it would inevitably
expose the deficiencies of their systems.] |
 |
| Chomsky’s
“creative aspect” of language is the property by which
it is possible for a person to utter acceptable grammatical sentences
which are unique in his experience and do not bear any point for
point analogy to sentences in his previous experience. By the same
principle, the individual is able to understand without difficulty
grammatical sentences of his language which are unlike any already
known to him.5
Chomsky uses this phenomenon as an argument in favor of his innate
universal grammar. It can also be applied to metaphorical language,
however, which in its natural form (i.e., when it arises out of
a need to express a new experience not covered by the speaker’s
vocabulary, as opposed to its deliberate or contrived use in poetic
language) is a necessary innovation to describe a novel situation.
[It is perfectly possible, nevertheless,
to imagine a commonplace expression which a person has heard frequently
in its literal application, given a metaphorical meaning by application
to a new situation. A child, for example, may hear the expression,
“It’s snowing out,” used to describe a condition
of the weather. The same child, in an energetic pillow fight which
issues in an unexpected shower of feathers, may jubilantly exclaim,
“It’s snowing out!” The creativity which produces
this utterance is neither Skinner’s generic extension, for
it is not an new instance of an old experience; nor is it Chomsky’s
creative aspect, for no new utterance is emitted; but rather, a
familiar expression is adapted to convey a new meaning. Moreover,
the child, if asked what has really taken place, is not apt to maintain
that snow has actually fallen. He is not under the necessity of
using the image to explain an otherwise inexpressible occurrence.
He is simply taking pleasure in his ability to perceive a similarity
between the white flurry he has created and the fall of snow he
enjoys in winter.] |
 |
| Although the
creative aspect of language can be made to apply to certain kinds
of metaphorical innovation, it is not unreasonable to suppose that
if this were part of Chomsky’s intention he would have so stated
it. Assuredly Chomsky is not ignorant of the concept of metaphor;
and if he had considered that a principle, such as that of creativity,
within the scope of this stated theory would give a satisfactory
account of the metaphorical use of language, it seems unlikely that
he would have chosen deliberately to leave so critical an area as
metaphor unexplained in his system. |
|
| It is to their distinct
advantage that two writers in the field, Susanne K. Langer and William
P. Alston, are not laboring under the constraint of having to justify
their own theories. Instead, both make an effort, in Philosophy
in a New Key6
and Philosophy of Language7
respectively, to assemble what seem to them the most satisfying
and logical accounts of the phenomena of language, and draw their
own conclusions without reference to a preconceived scheme. Consequently,
both advance into the realm of metaphor with considerably more realism
and thoroughness than does either Skinner or Chomsky. |
|
| Mrs. Langer
approaches the subject by way of speculation about the origin of
language itself. She points out the natural inclination of the human
infant to babble meaningless syllables, and contrasts this tendency
with the silence of other animals, including chimpanzees, even in
infancy. The human infant is encouraged in this practice by vocal
response from other human beings, and certain of its syllabic patterns
are reinforced. Feral children, at least in the documented cases
she cites, experience no such reinforcement by other speaking creatures,
and consequently when brought into civilization they have no language
of their own and no conception of language, and cannot successfully
be persuaded to learn it. |
|
| The origin
of language in the human species, she suggests, is to be found in
ritual, where songs—probably random rhythmic syllables at first—came
into being to accompany particular ceremonies. [Men
found that by repeating these syllable patterns at other times they
could call to mind the occasion of the ceremony. This symbolic attachment
of idea or thing to sound—a sound by which the concept could
actually be meaningfully invoked apart from its ceremonial context—was
the initial stage in the development of a complex, subtle system
of articulation which is now a highly sophisticated vehicle for
communication.] |
 |
| On the strength
of theories set forth by J. Donovan and Philip Wegener, among others,
Mrs. Langer brings metaphorical extension into the process of linguistic
growth at that most primitive level.8
[The meaning of an expression
is heavily dependent upon its context, physical or verbal. At the
most simplistic level—much as a child or a foreigner unaccustomed
to the language would do—a person can conceivably make his
thoughts known through the utterance of as little as a single word,
accompanied by appropriate gestures to indicate physical objects
and so forth. Similarly, such one-word propositions largely reliant
on context may have constituted the first efforts at direct verbal
communication.] |
 |
| In order to
meet the many inevitable difficulties of such limited discourse,
however, syntactic forms must have developed by a process of emendation.
[Where emendation accounts for
structure, metaphor accounts for generality.]
Rousseau, in his own speculation as to the beginnings of language,9
observes that at a very primitive level the language must have been
large, since each object would have its own name without regard
for genus and species. Each individual tree, for example, would
be distinguished from any other, and all nouns would in effect be
proper names. [Mrs. Langer offers
Wegener’s theory of logical analogy as the means by which a
known expression is adapted to a novel situation. The meaning of
the expression used takes on the character of symbol for the thing
which it is used to express. Wegener suggests that metaphor is the
source of all general words. “Metaphor,” says Mrs. Langer,
“is our most striking evidence of abstractive seeing,
of the power of human minds to use presentational symbols. Every
new experience, or new idea about things, evokes first of all some
metaphorical expression.”10] |
|
| One point on
which all sources seem to concur is that metaphor is the principal
instrument of growth of the language. In Mrs. Langer’s words:
“One might say that, if ritual is the cradle of language, metaphor
is the law of its life. It is the force that makes it essentially
relational, intellectual, forever showing up new, abstractable
forms in reality, forever laying down a deposit of old, abstracted
concepts in an increasing treasure of general words.”11
And further: “Metaphor is the law of growth of every semantic.
It is not a development, but a principle.”12 |
|
| While it is
by the process of metaphorical extension itself that the language
is enlarged to include new concepts, it is by the actual assimilation
of such expressions into the language that the language grows. The
key notion here is that of “faded” or “dead”
metaphor. In their accounts of this phenomenon, Skinner,13
Langer,14
and Alston15
all present fundamentally the same view: namely, that once a metaphorical
expression is adopted generally as a successful presentation of
a certain idea, it loses its metaphorical impact. In the behaviorist’s
view, it becomes as much a single expression as is an isolated word,
and its appropriate application is reinforced by the verbal community
in the same way. The philosophical view of Langer maintains that
the literal meanings of the component terms are enlarged, and the
meaning of the focal expression itself becomes more generalized,
and consequently its range of applicability is even further increased.
Alston’s view is situated about midway between the two, in
indicating that the expression itself develops an acceptable kind
of literal usage, but concluding with a reference to “the very
important role of metaphor in initiating uses of words that can
eventually grow into new senses.”16 |
|
| Up to this
point in our discussion we have used the terms “metaphor,”
“metaphorical extension,” and “metaphorical expression”
freely, without proposing a definition for those terms. Our evasion
of the question heretofore may be to some extent justifiable in
the light of the difficulty which various experts appear to have
had in formulating their own definitions. Skinner does not attempt
a formal definition at all, though he approaches definition at several
points. After explaining the nature of generic extension, he states
the following by way of transition into metaphorical extension:
“A second type of extension takes place because of the control
exercised by properties of the stimulus which, though present at
reinforcement, do not enter into the contingency respected by the
verbal community This is the familiar process of metaphor.”17
He asserts that “the only difference between metaphorical and
generic extension in the kind of property which gains control of
the response.”18
To amplify the notion of “property,” he says: “The
properties or conditions by virtue of which something may serve
as a symbol for something else are precisely the properties or conditions
responsible for metaphorical extension.”19
Skinner thus explains how a metaphor comes about, and what its characteristics
are, but he does not say what it is. |
 |
| Mrs. Langer
falls into the use of metaphorical expressions to describe the nature
of metaphor, as can be seen in the passage already quoted. Her nearest
approach to a definition is the following unsatisfactorily vague
statement: “In a genuine metaphor, an image of the literal
meaning is our symbol for the figurative meaning, the thing that
has no name of its own.”20 |
 |
| Alston makes
a number of significant observations, and includes revealing ideas
of other theorists, on the nature and function of metaphor. But
his definition also, though presenting richer possibilities than
those given above, is woefully incomplete. After qualifying his
use of the term “figurative” thus: “Wherever an expression
is used so that, even though it is used in none of its established
senses, nevertheless, what is said is intelligible to a fairly sensitive
person with a command of the language, the expression will be said
to be used figuratively,”21
he gives his definition: “Metaphor is the sort of figurative
use in which the extension is on the basis of similarity.”22 |
 |
| Consultation
of dictionaries and reference works23
proved even less rewarding. Despite a surprising degree of variation
among them, they all tend to turn on such notions as comparison
between two objects, the substitution of one expression for another,
and the identification of one thing with another. None of these
is free enough from misconceptions or narrow limitations that it
is not a simple matter to suggest several legitimate metaphors which
they would exclude. [None of
those which deals in substitution, identification, or comparison
can account for such a common proverbial expression as “In
the night all cats are black.”] |
 |
| The most definitive,
yet still inconclusive, discourse we have encountered on the subject
is that of Max Black.24
The inconclusiveness lies in the fact that Black examines several
conflicting views of metaphor—which he calls the “substitution”
view, the “comparison” view, and the “interaction”
view—and finds suitable examples of each, even while showing
their incompatibility. His purpose is not so much to analyze the
nature of metaphor as it is to justify its appearance in philosophical
writing; and his conclusion is that it performs a necessary function,
and should therefore not be censured. Thus, although he makes in
the process cogent observations on metaphor itself, he does not
impose judgments as to the relative validity of the various views.
He considered, instead, that each is appropriate in certain cases.
Accordingly, he joins the writers already mentioned, in failing
to offer a practical and comprehensive definition. |
|
| Among the subdivisions
of metaphor made for the purpose of analysis are decorative vs.
structural,25
current vs. faded, reducible vs. irreducible,26
and Max Black’s threefold distinction. The last two types of
subdivision shed the most light on the question. The substitution
view, which Black identifies as “any view which holds that
a metaphorical expression is used in place of some equivalent literal
expression,”27
has been the most widely accepted view among writers on the subject.
Variations on this same theme form the essence of the definitions
Black cited, including the entry in the Oxford Dictionary, as well
as the definitions alluded to above. This type of metaphor functions
by means of a frame, the literal context in which the metaphorical
expression occurs, and a focus, the term which is being used
metaphorically. A special case of the substitution view is the comparison
view, which differs in that a literal phrase of comparison, rather
than a literal equivalent expression, is considered proper translation
for the metaphor. With the exception of Black, who proposes alternatives,
the substitution view is held in common by all the writers under
consideration. |
|
| [Strangely
enough, although they all offer similarity between literal and substituted
expressions as the basis of metaphor, only Skinner gives much consideration
to the differences between the two terms. Perhaps it is belaboring
the obvious to call attention to those differences; but the issues
involved in the discussion are ill-defined enough to warrant that
risk. It seems logical to assume, first of all, that many expressions
that could be substituted for a given term on the basis of similarity
would not be metaphors at all, but some other literal equivalent.
Therefore, to replace a term with an analogous terms is not necessarily
to create a figure of speech. The function of similarity in metaphor
is largely technical or mechanical: namely, to justify the substitution
by making the whole expression intelligible.] |
 |
| [But
the impact of the metaphor depends solely on the differences—their
nature, degree, quality, and direction. It is by bringing into play
a set of denotations and connotation which must be reconciled with
the literal sense of the frame that the extension actually
occurs. The point of metaphor is that the extended term makes available
implications that are specifically not inherent in any corresponding
literal term. Accordingly, those who regard metaphor as a way of
identifying one thing with another are misconstruing it: it is emphatically
not an equation. The similarity of the two terms is but the bridge
by which the metaphorical term may enter the context. The metaphorical
expression is not present in order to say something about the missing
term; it is there to say something about all the other terms that
are present. And it is precisely by stating a condition as if true
which is self-evidently not true in any literal sense that
the effect is achieved.] |
 |
| In a limited
way, Skinner’s treatment of the subject reflects a concern
for disparity as well as similarity. By way of cautious approach,
he states: “Sometimes a genuine extension seems to occur when
no similarity expressible in the terms of physical science can be
demonstrated.”28
Examples follow in which he illustrates possible stimuli that may
affect the subject in the same way: such as the strong visual and
auditory sensations involved in a comparison of the color scarlet
to “the blare of a trumpet.” His words gather emphasis,
however, as he proceeds to explain why the verbal symbolism of metaphor
is ultimately more effective than the symbolism of other modes of
expression, such as painting, and he concludes: “The extended
tact [metaphorical expression] frees the properties of objects one
from the other, and thus makes possible a recombination which is
not restricted by the exigencies of the physical world.”29 |
|
| The third view
of metaphor proposed by Max Black is designated as the “interaction
view,” which represents an altogether different interpretation
of the matter. Here the meaning draws upon the “system of associated
commonplaces” which attends the metaphorical term (or, alternately,
depends on associations which the larger context provides: specific
supplemental data included by the writer to support the metaphor).30
Two terms instead of one—the primary subject and the subsidiary
subject, which correspond approximately to the literal and the metaphorical
components in the substitution view—are active in producing
the effect. The reader “connects” them31
by a mysterious process, and in so doing selects from among
those commonplaces the meanings of the subsidiary subject that he
can apply to the primary. These selected implications serve to organize
the reader’s conception of the primary subject. The subsidiary
subject, in turn, undergoes certain modifications by its application
to the primary subject. |
|
| Black’s
purpose in writing the article is to make a case for the legitimacy
of metaphor in philosophical discourse. After analyzing the three
views of metaphor and showing that each is an appropriate view for
some but not all instances, he maintains in his final remarks that
the use of metaphor is justifiable because it is often the most
effective means of conveying an idea. A metaphorical expression
is capable of presenting precise shades of meaning in an accurate
balance that literal language would distort; furthermore, it can
provide the insight lacking in a literal expression. On this point,
Black is in perfect accord with Skinner, who says: “Even when
a nonextended tact [literal expression] is available, the metaphor
may have an advantage. It may be more familiar,, and it may affect
the listener in other ways, particularly in arousing emotional responses.”32
This remark enters directly into the province of poetry, of which
metaphor is a principal form. |
|
| [Whereas
in the natural use of language a new situation may elicit a metaphorical
response out of necessity, in poetic language metaphor is deliberately
chosen in order to enrich the meaning of the statement. In speech
a metaphor must be spontaneous; otherwise, the occasion passes.
Ordinary conversation does not normally wait upon inspiration. The
metaphor of poetry, however, is calculated; the poem is written
expressly for the purpose of using such language, or the writer
would not choose the genre at all. In poetry, then, the use of metaphor
is carefully controlled with regard to nuance, aesthetic quality,
emotional and psychological value, and originality of thought. The
prime purpose of metaphor in poetry is one with the function of
poetry itself: to recreate subjectively in the reader the experience
of which the poet writes. The poet seeks to arouse in the reader
the same feelings which impel him to write the poem, to cause the
reader to participate directly in the same inner experience. In
order to achieve this, the poet must choose and devise the most
evocative language accessible to him. He does not wish merely to
decorate, and neither does he desire to put his reader through an
exercise in translation and substitution of literal terms. He wants
to produce an effect. |
|
| Assuredly he
must make certain assumptions about his reader’s general knowledge,
sensitivity, and emotional susceptibilities. Some poets demand considerably
more of their readers than others, and some apparently expect their
readers to take on faith the fact that there is design behind seemingly
incomprehensible expressions. Many readers feel that the effort
required to penetrate abstruse verse is amply rewarded by the depth
of the insights gained. Ultimately a poet’s choice of a metaphor
or other figure must be instinctive; and the ability instinctively
to choose a supremely effective metaphor is the distinction between
poetic talent and poetic genius. It cannot be produced by computation
or by lists of associated commonplaces; it must come from a powerful
inner consciousness of the idea to be conveyed, along with a strong
imagination that can dissociate an expression from its literal uses
and recognize its aptness for his purpose.] |
|
| [Thought
is generally considered to be a verbal process. But in order for
metaphor to occur either naturally or by design, the thought must
exist in some pre-verbal condition. The commercial success of Roget’s
Thesaurus (which, incidentally, was conceived for no such
vulgar usage) attests to the fact that the word needed to convey
a given thought is frequently not a part of the writer’s active
vocabulary. In speech a poor equivalent may be substituted to fill
the requirement of the moment; but in writing, even with leisure
for consideration, the word may elude the mind. Often the Thesaurus
simply recalls a familiar word; but I would venture to say that
there is no writer who has not at some time searched its pages or
his memory in vain for a word that just does not exist. The thought
is nevertheless painfully real.] |
 |
| [It
is a fact that the English language lacks words for various significant
concepts: for example., an adjective to describe a person who possesses
integrity; a noun to represent the act of ignoring; and an adjective
to denote the relationship to oneself of a person one would call
“friend.” The evidence indicates
that it is not necessary for a word to exist in order for a person
to entertain the concept. Further support comes from the existence
in one language of a concept absent from another language. A common
example is the German gemütlich, which has no literal
English equivalent. Certainly a person who knows only English can
nonetheless find himself in a situation in which the expression
he desires to use has the meaning of gemütlich. |
|
| It appears,
then, that there is a level of understanding which exists apart
from the verbal faculty. Although verbal expression is the primary
channel through which the understanding is stimulated by external
and internal contingencies, and through which it is itself expressed,
it is not the exclusive channel.] |
|
| [Just
as coding language must undergo translation into electronic impulses
before a computer can utilize a program, so there is a kind of translation
which takes place between the verbal and the pre-verbal level of
thought. A normal literal expression is analyzed in this process
of translation, and the relationships among its terms determine
the meanings which enter the gate of understanding. When a metaphorical
expression undergoes the same translation process, the relationships
that control the meaning are semantic as well as syntactic. Once
it reaches the pre-verbal level, the concept is grasped without
regard to literal equivalents.] |
 |
| If a literal
equivalent can be returned back through the verbal channel from
the understanding, that metaphor is what Alston would call “reducible.”
Some metaphors, on the other hand, are “irreducible.”33
Here, it is not a case of a better way to express an idea, or a
subtler, or a more effective way; quite simply, it is the only way.
Those metaphors, which Ayer would undoubtedly classify among the
meaningless expressions, are the one which apply to God and to inner
feelings. Among Alston’s revealing examples are the statements:
“God has punished me” and “I felt a stabbing pain.”
Neither the word “punished” nor the term “stabbing”
can be understood literally. Both expressions depend on an implied
comparison of the situation described with a situation in which
the expressions could be literally applied. Alston shows that any
effort to reduce such statements to literal terms will only generate
further metaphors. Thus, apart from all other purposes—innovative,
effectual, and poetic—metaphor is literally necessary as an
instrument of communication. |
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|
